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Abstract: 
The uneven reaction of the international community to the Crimean crisis has 
highlighted once more how states weigh differently the current relationship between 
the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination (a fact already evident 
with, e.g., Kosovo). On the one hand, challenges to territorial integrity are scholarly 
considered only on grounds of ‘remedial secession’ (entailing, as a minimum, sys-
tematic repression over the ‘people’ of a ‘self-determination unit’ by the sovereign), 
which is even then opposed by many states. On the other hand, the questionable ipso 
facto application, under the U.N. Charter regime, of the uti possidetis juris princi-
ple to determine international boundaries outside the colonial context (e.g., SFRY, 
Kosovo, Crimea), seems to be distorting the outcome of self-determination instances 
and analyses (as opposed to contributing to settling disputes). Moving from the dif-
ferent international reactions to the Crimean transfer from Ukraine to Russia in 
2014, and reviewing elements already mature in international law, or part of the 
actual state practice, this article investigates whether a new approach on the under-
standing of the relationship between territorial integrity and self-determination in a 
specific set of circumstances is de facto emerging. Purposely discarding the question 
on the alleged use of force, the article reviews the five discernible and cumulative 
conditions that seems underlying the hypothesized emerging understanding, on the 
basis of which a territorial transfer may be legitimate, notwithstanding the lack of 
consent of the current sovereign, when (a) a ‘deficient’ title to territorial sovereignty 
is challenged by (b) the clear will of the people of a self-determination unit to reunite 
with (c) the former sovereign, by virtue of (d) strong cultural and historical links, in 
light of (e) the failure of the current sovereign to properly address long-standing in-
ternal self-determination instances and ultimately to perform basic state functions. 
The article then looks at the impact at large of this possibly emerging interpretive 
reassessment of the principle of territorial integrity. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In several international law gatherings following the secession of Crimea from Ukraine 
and its subsequent accession to the Russian Federation (March 2014), scholars repeatedly 
expressed their satisfaction that the international legal community ‘this time’ (as opposed, 
e.g., to 1999 NATO’s bombing of Serbia, 2003 invasion of Iraq, or 2008 Kosovo declaration of 
independence) found itself unanimous in considering both acts inconsistent with interna-
tional law, as unlawfully facilitated—when not fabricated—by Russia. North(-West) media 
took an even more solid stance.1 
 
1. E.g., Slawomir Sierakowski, Putin’s Useful Idiots, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/opinion/sierakowski-putins-useful-idiots.html?_r=0>; or the allegation that 
the Russian President is afflicted by the Asperger syndrome contained in a study prepared for the Office of Net As-
sessment - Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, leaked in early 2015: B. CONNORS, A TECHNICAL REPORT ON 
THE NATURE OF MOVEMENT PATTERING, THE BRAIN AND DECISION-MAKING (JAN. 2008). 
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Such an undivided representation of “rampant hypocrisy”
2
 throughout North(-West) 
quarters found no correspondence at the General Assembly, where the resolution on the 
‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’ passed with just over half of the overall votes in favor (100 
out of 193 members). 
The difference of stance between a unanimous legal community and a much less so politi-
cal community prompted the author to tackle a review of the different perception of facts and 
their legal characterization and consequences that the members of the latter display with 
regard to the Crimean crisis—in what ultimately emerges to be a divide between the 
North(-West) and the South(-East) of the world. By undertaking such an endeavor, the au-
thor is aware to be tiptoeing through the minefield of highly sensitive topics in the limited 
space of an article. For this very reason, this contribution does not presume nor aim to be 
exhaustive, but only to offer a preliminary non-mainstream analysis of the issue. 
Section 1 outlines the relationship between the shifting world economic balance and the 
making (and understanding) of international law. Section 2 analyses the links between the 
issue at hand and the case of Kosovo, focusing on the stance of the international community. 
Section 3 opens to the core issue of this submission, and offers a framework of facts and 
stance of the international community with regard to the Crimean transfer. Section 4 focus-
es on the central legal issues at stake and articulates the key elements of the interpretive 
reassessment of the principle of territorial integrity that may be drawn from the behavior of 
the international community. Lastly, Section 5 offers a brief review of the impact at large of 
such reassessment.   
II. THE NORTH(-WEST) V. SOUTH(-EAST) MACROECONOMIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIVIDE 
It is generally undisputed that international law is a law of Western European creation.3 
It is also commonly accepted that this is a consequence of roughly five centuries of European 
colonialism, and the resulting North(-West) dominance over the world’s economic relations.4 
This analysis thus moves from the assumption that the making and evolution of interna-
tional law is driven by those states that progressively share the most significant portions of 
world trade and wealth, by virtue of the influence that such wealth allows to assert (through 
vast networks of international relations grounded on solid economic ties). 
The modernization of a number of densely populated countries is altering the recalled  
status quo. Concurrently, the creation of new international fora (such as the G20) to include 
 
2. As defined by Marko Milanovic, Crimea, Kosovo, Hobgoblins and Hypocrisy, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-kosovo-hobgoblins-and-hypocrisy/. 
3.  See, B. G. RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION – ITS APPROACH TO THE CODIFICATION AND 
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 112 (Martinus Nijhoff 1977). 
4.  For a general essay on the topic, see W. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE – HOW TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD 
(New York: Grove Press 2008). 
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those new players in jointly addressing world economic issues constitutes an attempt to as-
sociate the ‘rising powers’ to the ‘traditional powers’ (e.g., the G7).5 Nevertheless, even with-
in the G20, Brazil, Russia, India, China and Mexico are expected to raise their share of G20 
GDP from 18.7 percent in 2009 to 49.2 percent by 2050.6 Should Indonesia (let alone, the en-
tire ASEAN)7 be taken into account, that figure would rise to approximately 55 percent. In-
versely, the G7 share of G20 GDP is expected to decline from 72.3 percent to 40.1 percent.8 
Another shift, equally dramatic, may well accompany the foregoing. In fact, this ‘South-
ern group’ of the G20 nations appears to share a different understanding of the basic tenets 
of international law, as enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.N. Charter, from sovereignty 
to territorial integrity, from non-interference to self-determination. This alternative reading, 
championed in the Security Council by Russia and China, usually rests on a more textual 
and ‘conservative understanding’ of the consent granted to international obligations. Russia 
and China are vast, multi-ethnic states, with a past common ideology (despite fractious), 
several similar traits in their current political and economic regimes, the will to strengthen 
cooperation (both under an economic and military perspective),9 and support each other’s 
international claims.10 Their approach to international law tends to oppose another, tradi-
tionally supported by the U.S. and the U.K., which in the past decades has favored a more 
teleological or evolutionary interpretation of several international norms, especially in those 
cases where existing international law instruments result unavailable or ineffective to cer-
tain ends (e.g., stalemate at the Security Council).  
Whether over the next decades the rising South(-East) nations, within and outside the 
G20, will associate to the latter interpretation, it is a matter outside the scope of the present 
analysis. It may nonetheless be observed that, to that end, a more globally uniform under-
standing of scope and contents of international human right standards and obligations is 
 
5. Liberal economies, such as Australia or South Korea, or that of states traditionally linked with the West, such as 
Turkey, Argentina, Mexico, or Saudi Arabia, contribute to ‘dilute’ and contain the weight of economies such as 
China, India, Brazil or Indonesia, while joining all participants in a common elite forum where the economic 
weight of traditional G7 economies, decreasing relatively to the world, still hold the majority. For an essay on the 
matter, see KAROLINE POSTEL-VINAY, THE G20: A NEW GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER (Palgrave Pivot 2013). 
6. Uri Dadush & Bennett Stancil, The G20 in 2050, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Nov. 19, 
2009), http://carnegieendowment.org/ieb/2009/11/19/g20-in-2050. 
7. Association of South-East Asian Nations, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. 
8. Dadush & Stancil, supra note 6. 
9.   See, e.g., the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the 1997 Moscow Treaty on the Reduction of Mili-
tary Forces in Border Regions; see also the Altai gas pipeline project. 
10.  Russia’s claim over the Kyril Islands and China’s over the Senkako/Diaoyu and Spratly Islands, and the joint 
statements of 2010 and 2013, where the two reportedly committed to support each other “on sovereignty, unity and 
territorial integrity.”  See, e.g., Sovmestnoe zayavlenie Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki o 
vsestoronnem uglublenii rossiyskokitayskikh otnosheniy partnerstva i strategicheskogo vzaimodeystviya [Joint 
Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Deepening the Comprehensive Strate-
gic Partnership of Cooperation of Russian-Chinese relations] (Sept. 27, 2010), available at 
http://kremlin.ru/supplement/719 [hereinafter Joint Statement]. 
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needed. It may also happen, however, that the ‘conservative understanding’ will become 
(rectius, return) dominant. With reference again to macroeconomic projections, and with re-
gard to the Security Council and its role as the guarantor of the world’s international peace 
and security,11 it seems that, by 2050, China and Russia combined are expected to outweigh 
the U.S. and the U.K. (and, adding France, there would approximately be a tie).12 In addi-
tion, other major developing multi-ethnic states, such as India and Brazil, are offering re-
peated proof that they share Russia’s and China’s general understanding of international 
relations and law. For instance, in 2011, in the context of a few weeks long crisis in Libya 
that had seemingly caused about 1,000 victims,13 France performed airstrikes to protect ci-
vilians minutes after the Security Council passed Res. 1973—with, however, five absten-
tions: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Germany.14  
In light of the outlined ongoing world macroeconomic shift, and of the different stances 
the new actors tend to express with regard to international law and relations, certain cur-
rent North(-West)-led interpretations—e.g., on the relationship between self-determination 
and territorial integrity,15 or between humanitarian crises and interventions without the 
consent of the sovereign (the so-called R2P)16—may over the next decades stall or retrocede, 
from doctrines supported by the (selective) practice of some states, back to plain violation of 
international law. It is also possible, however, that new interpretive approaches to the read-
ing of the existing customary and treaty obligations may emerge.  
In this context, this submission intends to assess whether the different stances the inter-
national community expressed (explicitly or implicitly) with regard to the Crimean crisis de-
rive from a legitimate interpretation of the current international legal framework (as op-
posed to pure political convenience) for which the Crimean transfer would be ‘not in violation 
of international law.’
17
 Divergences in the context of the Crimean crisis are believed to be 
determined by an inconsistent state practice, over the past decades, even among those states 
supportive of more advanced doctrines. Such lack of consistency contributes, in turn, to per 
se legitimate attempts by other states to assert their understanding of the international le-
gal framework.
18
 
 
11.  U.N. Charter art. 24. 
12. Dadush & Stancil, supra note 6. 
13. See Alan Kuperman, Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, (March/April 2015), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143044/alan-j-kuperman/obamas-libya-
debacle.   
14. See S.C. Res. 1973, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
15. Cf. The 10 Supplements on Article 1(2) Charter collected in the Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, 
from 1945 to 2009.  Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, U.N. DOC., http://legal.un.org/repertory. 
16.   G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, at 138-140 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
17. Echoing the way the International Court of Justice rephrased the question put to it by the General Assembly in the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion; see infra note 26. 
18. See William W. Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order, 1360, U. PENN. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
REPOSITORY: FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP (2014), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1360. 
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III. THE NON-PRECEDENT PRECEDENT OF KOSOVO’S SECESSION FROM SERBIA 
It has been noted that, while legally distinguishable, the cases of Kosovo and Crimea “are 
still close enough.”
19
 Hence, an assessment of the Crimean transfer may not neglect a pre-
liminary review of the stance of the international community on Kosovo’s secession from 
Serbia.  
The overall management and outcome of the Kosovo crisis has drawn significant criti-
cism.
20
 First, it has been noted that the 1999 NATO humanitarian intervention, outside of 
the U.N. system, took place in the face of massive displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
Albanian Kosovars, but not in a context of civil war or attempted genocide. More important-
ly, notwithstanding U.N. and E.U. subsequent efforts to stabilize the region (or right be-
cause of those efforts), the intervention ultimately resulted in the 2008 declaration of inde-
pendence of Kosovo. Such a development is inconsistent with Security Council Res. 1244, 
which reaffirmed the commitment to respect the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (since 2003, Serbia).21 For the U.S. (which immediately recognized Kosovo), 
and U.N. Secretary General Ki-Moon, Kosovo represents a sui generis or ‘highly distinctive’ 
case, which may not constitute a precedent.22 Various separatist movements, and the Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization, adopted—comprehensibly—a different stance.23 States op-
posing Kosovo’s independence have, conversely, referred to it as a dangerous precedent.24  
 
19. See Milanovic, supra note 2. 
20. See THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED ch. 3, 6 (Oxford University 
Press 2000); see also Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 
824 (1999); KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT? – THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 48 (James Summers ed., Brill 
2011).  
21. S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999). 
22.  Jack Goldsmith, The Precedential Value of the Kosovo Non-Precedent Precedent for Crimea, LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 
2014 10:00 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/the-precedential-value-of-the-kosovo-non-precedent-
precedent-for-crimea/.   
23.   Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, Recognition of Palestinian Statehood: A Clarification of the Interests of the 
Concerned Parties, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L., 341, 343 (2012); see also the statement of the Basque nationalist 
PNV party (as reported by BBC at: Reaction in quotes: UN legal ruling on Kosovo, BBC (July 22, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-10733837). 
24. See, e.g., the position of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bojana Barlovac & Sabina Arslanagic, World Reacts 
to ICJ Advisory Ruling on Kosovo, BALKANINSIGHT.COM (July 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/world-reacts-to-icj-advisory-ruling-on-kosovo); the Russian President 
statement that “Any resolution on Kosovo should be approved by both sides. It is also clear that any resolution on 
Kosovo will set a precedent in international practice” (as reported by BBC at:  Putin Urges Consensus on Kosovo, 
BBC (Jan. 17, 2008, 12:15 PM), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7193225.stm); the Russian Foreign 
Minister statement that “[A precedent is objectively created not just for South Ossetia and Abkhazia but also for an 
estimated 200 territories around the world.] If someone is allowed to do something, many others will expect similar 
treatment” (as reported by Reuters: Michael Stott, Russia says Kosovo Creates Precedent for Separatists, REUTERS 
(Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/01/23/uk-russia-kosovo-lavrov-
idUKL2336145020080123). 
15 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (2017) 
132 
In 2010, responding to the question put forth by the General Assembly, “[i]s the unilat-
eral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Koso-
vo in accordance with international law?,” the International Court of Justice (ICJ), after hav-
ing adjusted the question addressed before it in order not to pronounce on the actual legality 
of Kosovo’s independence, answered that, “[t]he Court … is of the opinion that the declara-
tion of independence of Kosovo … did not violate international law.”25 Legal byzantinisms 
aside, several states expressed concerns that this taking could open the ‘Pandora’s box’ of 
separatist instances.26 The Court’s Opinion has been, in fact, effectively interpreted as facili-
tating recognition by creating a political opportunity to do so: several of the 38 states that to 
date have recognized Kosovo expressly relied on it.27  
Indeed, with respect to either intervention or recognition, state practice looks at the heart 
of a distinguishable rule (as opposed to overly complex legal speculations) and cannot be un-
done by arbitrarily or unilaterally attaching a sui generis label: as it has been noted, “the 
precedential value of an action under international law cannot be established at the time of 
the action, but rather is determined by how the action is interpreted and used in the fu-
ture.”28 The case of the widening recognition of Kosovo following the ICJ Opinion is emblem-
atic in this sense. 
Currently, 108 U.N. members recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state. With the exception 
of two ASEAN members (Thailand and Malaysia), no major South(-East) nation has, by the 
time of writing of this submission, recognized Kosovo. Conversely, the U.S., most E.U. mem-
bers,29 Canada, Australia, and Japan have all recognized it (some, soon after its declaration 
of independence). The map and figure below provide an illustration of the point. 
 
 
25.   Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶ 122 (July 22).  Noteworthy the ironic critique of Valerie Epps, Commentary, The 
Paucity of Law in the ICJ’s 2010 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 19 INT’L L. 
STUDENT ASS’N Q. 26 (2010). 
26.   See Comment by Russian MFA Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko in Connection with International Court of Justice 
Opinion on Kosovo, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (July 22, 2010),  
http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/conflicts/-
/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/240690/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_xIEMTQ3OvzcA_viewMode=p
rint&_101_INSTANCE_xIEMTQ3OvzcA_languageId=en_GB&_101_INSTANCE_xIEMTQ3OvzcA_qrIndex=
0.  
27.   Richard Caplan & Stefan Wolff, Some Implications of the Advisory Opinion for Resolution of the Serbia-Kosovo 
Conflict, in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE KOSOVO ADVISORY OPINION 317, 320 (Marko Milanović & Michael 
Wood eds., 2015).  See also THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW – AN ANALYTICAL 
DOCUMENTATION 1974–1999 115 (Heike Krieger ed., Cambridge University Press 2012). 
28. Goldsmith, supra note 22. 
29. With the exception of Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece and Cyprus.  
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To establish whether Kosovo is a state, or if the lack of recognition of some 85 U.N. mem-
bers (among which, most of the ‘East’ and ‘South’ of the world, including two permanent 
members of the Security Council, and the Holy See) is an obstacle to its statehood, is out of 
the scope of this analysis. Kosovo, for the purposes here intended, is just an instance to illus-
trate that a significant part of the world does not seem to share what appears plain in most 
North(-West) quarters.
30
 The map above is believed to offer a representation of the point (es-
pecially if read in conjunction with that presented further below). 
IV. THE CASE OF THE CRIMEAN TRANSFER FROM UKRAINE TO RUSSIA 
A. Essential overview of the relevant facts 
On 28 November 2013, the President of the Unitary Republic of Ukraine,31 filo-Russian 
Mr. Yanukovich, refused to sign the Association Agreement with the E.U., at a summit or-
 
30. See Declaration of the South Summit, GROUP OF 77 SOUTH SUMMIT (Apr. 10-14, 2000), 
http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm. (Rejecting a right of humanitarian intervention. Kosovo 
was not expressly mentioned but the reference is clear considering the time of the declaration, and that Yugoslavia 
was a founding member of the group.) 
31. On the formal name of Ukraine, compare Arts. 2 and 5 of all Ukrainian Constitutions (1996, 2004, 2010, and 
2014). Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 With Amendments Through 2004, available at 
Yes: 
108 
No: 
85 
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ganized in Vilnius (Lithuania) to that end. The decision sparked protests and public demon-
strations in Kiev and Western Ukraine (supporting E.U. integration). On 29 January 2014, 
President Yanukovich flew to Moscow, officially on sick leave. On the 22 of February, the 
Rada (the Ukrainian parliament), by a controversial vote, had Yanukovich removed from his 
post and replaced ad interim with filo-E.U. Mr. Turchynov.32 The following day, the Rada 
repealed a 2012 law that allowed for an increased use, at all state levels, of minority lan-
guages (including Russian), restoring Ukrainian as the sole state language. The repeal, 
nonetheless, never entered into force: on the 3 of March, the interim President declared he 
would not sign it (without, however, vetoing the act). Notwithstanding this, the overall situ-
ations brought protests and demonstrations to break out in various provinces of Eastern 
Ukraine—whose linguistic, ethnic and religious links with the Russian Federation are sig-
nificant. Russian there represents the principal ethnic group and spoken language,33 and 
significant support for Crimean separatism existed since before the independence of 
Ukraine.34  
Arguably emboldened by the fact that, on 1 March, the Duma (the Russian Parliament) 
authorized the Russian President to deploy troops in Ukraine “in connection with the ex-
traordinary situation in Ukraine and the threat to the lives of Russian citizens,”35 on 6 
March, the Crimean Parliament voted to “enter into the Russian Federation with the rights 
of a subject of the Russian Federation.”
36
 Ten days later, a referendum was held, asking 
Crimeans whether they wanted to join Russia as a federal subject, or restore the 1992 Cri-
mean constitution37 and remain part of Ukraine. Following overwhelming approval for the 
former option38 (whose validity is denied by a resolution of the General Assembly adopted on 
27 March),39 Crimea declared independence; the Supreme Council of Crimea forthwith 
unanimously endorsed the vote. On 18 March, the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of 
 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ukraine_2004.pdf; Constitution of Ukraine (2014), available at 
http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/UA/ukraine-constitution-2014/view.  
32. Rada Removes Yanukovych From Office, Schedules New Elections For May 25, INTERFAX-UKRAINE, 
http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/192030.html (the resolution did not follow the impeachment procedure, but 
instead established that the President “withdrew from his duties in an unconstitutional manner” and, citing “cir-
cumstances of extreme urgency” set new presidential elections for May 2014).  
33.   All Ukrainian Population Census 2001 (Dec. 5, 2001), http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng (according to the Ukraini-
an census of 2001, 58.1 percent of the Crimean population is of Russian ethnicity, and 77 percent of all Crimean 
citizens named Russian as their first language). 
34. See infra Section V(B)(4).  
35. Russian Parliament Approves Troop Deployment in Ukraine, BBC (Mar. 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26400035.  
36. Ukraine Crisis: Crimea Parliament Asks to Join Russia, BBC (Mar. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26465962.   
37. Crimea Referendum: Voters 'Back Russia Union', BBC (Mar. 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097. 
38. Crimea Declares Independence Seeks UN Recognition, RT NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 7:09 AM), available at 
https://www.rt.com/news/crimea-referendum-results-official-250/ (according to media reports, out of an 83.1 per-
cent turnout, 96.77 percent voted for integration).  
39. G.A Res. 68/262, ¶ 5 (Mar. 27, 2014). 
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Crimea and Sevastopol in the Russian Federation was signed,40 and submitted to the Duma 
the day after (together with the relevant constitutional amendment to add two new constitu-
ent territories to the Russian Federation).41 The Russian Constitutional Court, sitting in 
emergency session (requested by the President), found the Treaty in compliance with the 
Constitution. On 20 March, the Duma ratified the Treaty, as well as the Federation Council 
the day after. The President signed the ratification forthwith. Crimea’s admission to the 
Russian Federation was domestically granted retroactivity to 18 March, day of the signature 
of the Accession Treaty: it is from that day that Russia considers Crimea as having acceded 
to the Federation as the 22nd Republic (and 85th constitutional federal unit). 
Throughout the events, Ukraine and NATO repeatedly alleged that Russian military 
and/or para-military forces not only were present in Crimea (beside those stationing in the 
local Russian military base), but also actively engaged in securing Russia’s interests. While 
neither party disclosed conclusive evidence in this respect, on 17 April 2014, President Putin 
conceded the involvement of Russian Special Forces for the purposes of protecting local peo-
ple and maintaining order during the referendum (including containing Ukrainian armed 
forces within their premises in the peninsula).
42
 This aspect is dealt with in subsections IV.C 
and V.B.b, with regard to ‘use of force’ and ‘failure to exercise basic state functions’ respec-
tively. 
B.  General Assembly Resolution 68/262 
As already noted, the actions undertaken by Russia, with respect to both the secession of 
Crimea from Ukraine and accession to the Federation (and, especially, the alleged use of 
force by Russia in Ukraine), have been universally dismissed as plainly illegal by media, po-
litical leaders, and legal scholars in the North(-West). Russia, on the other hand, sought to 
legitimize its conduct by relying (fairly inconsistently) on various arguments, among which 
invitation, self-determination, the (anticipation of the) responsibility to protect (R2P) doc-
trine, violation of cultural rights, protection of the interest of Russia, and of Russians living 
in Crimea.
43
 Analogies have been proposed with Kosovo, its crisis management and outcome, 
as instances of state practice, and support drawn from the related ICJ Advisory Opinion. 
 
40. See Anatoliy Pronin, A treaty on accession of the Republic of Crimea and Sebastopol to the Russian Federation. 
Unofficial English Translation with Little Commentary, (Mar. 18, 2014), 
https://www.academia.edu/6481091/A_treaty_on_accession_of_the_Republic_of_Crimea_and_Sebastopol_to_the
_Russian_Federation._Unofficial_English_translation_with_little_commentary.  
41. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65 (Russ.).   
42. See David M. Herszenhorn, Away From Show of Diplomacy in Geneva, Putin Puts On a Show of His Own, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/world/europe/russia-ukraine.html?_r=0.    
43.   See Nico Krisch, Crimea and the Limits of International Law, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-and-the-limits-of-international-law/; see also Ashley Deeks, Russia in Ukraine: A 
Reader Responds, LAWFARE (Mar. 5, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/russia-ukraine-reader-
responds.    
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Russia also tried to frame the transfer of Crimea to Russia not as ‘annexation’ but ‘reunifica-
tion,’ ‘reintegration,’ or ‘return.’   
As noted, the unanimous Western perception appears not to reflect the sentiment of the 
international community as a whole. On 27 March 2014, the General Assembly voted—with 
100 votes in favor, 11 against, 58 abstentions, and 24 absent—a non-binding resolution ti-
tled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine,’ inter alia declaring that, “the referendum held in the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea … having no validity, cannot form the basis for any altera-
tion of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”44 It is submitted that the majority 
that passed this non-binding resolution not only fails the threshold to make an effective legal 
statement,
45
 but also highlights once more a North(-West) v. South(-East) divide in the un-
derstanding of facts and legal implications attached to it. Indeed, the distribution of votes 
provides some insights: even discarding the handful of states opposing adoption (as possibly 
driven to do so due to their ties with Russia—even though the same adjustment should then 
be factored out from the supporting states as well), the extension of abstentions and absenc-
es may come to surprise.
46
 The combined weight of rejecting and abstaining states repre-
sents approximately 40 percent of the votes expressed and, coupled with those absent at the 
time of voting, almost half of overall U.N. members, and roughly 70 percent of the world’s 
population.47 The map and figure below provide for a graphic illustration of this. 
 
 
 
44. G.A. Res. 68/262, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262, (Apr. 1, 2014).  
45.    See VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (Oxford 2007); Marko Divac Oberg, The Legal Effects of Resolu-
tions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16:5 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 879 
(2005);  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 
14, ¶ 188 (June 27);  Id. (separate opinion by Ago, J. at 184, ¶ 7; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weap-
ons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (Jul. 8).  
46. Burke-White, supra note 18, at 10.  
47. See U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess. 80th plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/68/L/39 (Mar. 27, 2014); see also Press Release, United 
Nations, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea 
Region (Mar. 27, 2014) (on file with the United Nations), available at 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm.  
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Some analogies with the earlier figures on Kosovo may be drawn. It is actually striking 
that, ASEAN aside, the map of states that have not voted in favor of adoption almost over-
lap. Moreover, while it is obviously incorrect to equate all abstentions and absences to con-
trary votes, in the context of the Crimean crisis it seems that some of these were ‘nays’ in 
disguise. The absences of Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, for instance, could be considered 
more as expressions of embarrassment to vote against, because of the links being concur-
rently built with the E.U. (unanimously in favor). Desire to avoid involvement may also be 
assumed on the part of all Russia’s Southern neighbors (and CIS members). The abstention 
of China48 follows its traditional stance on the politics of the “spheres of influence,”49 and 
 
48. See Shannon Tiezzi, China Reacts to the Crimea Referendum, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 18, 2014), available at 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-reacts-to-the-crimea-referendum/ (China’s UN Ambassador explained that 
“the vote on the draft resolution by the Security Council at this juncture will only result in confrontation and further 
Yes: 100 
52% 
No: 11 
6% 
Abstaine
d: 58 
30% 
Absent: 
24 12% 
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possibly the intention not to disrupt the economic and military links the two states are build-
ing.
50
 But the stance expressed by India,51 Brazil, South Africa, and the many other U.N. 
members that did not concur with the North(-West)-driven resolution could lead to the belief 
that Russia’s conduct is not perceived by most South(-East) as a flagrant violation of inter-
national law.  
If states must be presumed to act rationally (and in good faith), the same must be in the 
case of the international community as a whole, both when it expresses itself unanimously 
or as a split. Non-concurrence of roughly half of it to what the other half considers a stark 
violation of an international jus cogens norm needs to be investigated in its rationale. The 
result of such investigation may well have a legal dimension, or impact, not necessarily fall-
ing under the category “folk international law” censored by Harvard’s Professor Naz 
Modirzadeh.  
C. Discarding the argument on the use of force and act of aggres-
sion 
The assessment of the threat or use of force in the context of the Crimean transfer rests 
outside of the scope of this analysis, which pivots instead on the current understanding of 
the relationship between the Charter’s principles of territorial integrity and self-
determination
52
 as represented by the North(-West) and the South(-East) of the world. Nev-
ertheless, some additional considerations on GA Res. 68/262 seem appropriate, in order to 
better illustrate the rationale of the rest of this submission.  
Preliminarily, it must be highlighted that the international community has offered proof 
of strong majorities whenever the issue being dealt with was felt obviously incompatible 
with international law. For instance, on 18 December 1990, dealing with Iraq’s occupation of 
Kuwait, 144 members (out of a General Assembly then composed of 159) voted for the adop-
tion of a resolution inter alia condemning the invasion.
53
 In August 2012, in the attempt to 
circumvent China’s and Russia’s veto at the Security Council, 133 states voted in favor of a 
resolution condemning the Syrian regime for widespread human rights violations, and de-
 
complicate the situation, which is not in conformity with the common interest of both the people of the Ukraine 
and those of the international community”). The same position was reiterated prior to the vote on GA Res. 68/262. 
49. See, e.g., Gideon Rachman, China, Russia and the Sinatra Doctrine, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), available 
athttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/74419cd6-71a7-11e4-b178-
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3YFu7ZdfG; see also SUSANNA HAST, SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS – HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLITICS (2016). 
50. See, Joint Statement, supra note 10.  
51. See Zachary Keck, India Backs Russia’s ‘Legitimate Interests’ in Ukraine, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 8, 2014), availa-
ble at http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/india-backs-russias-legitimate-interests-in-ukraine/ (India referred to the will 
of the Crimean people and Russia’s interest in the region).  
52. See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22). 
53. G.A. Res. 45/170, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/170 (Dec. 18, 1990) (passing with Iraq as the only member to vote against 
and 14 absents). 
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manding the cessation of all violence.
54
 On 29 March 2012, circumventing the U.S. veto at 
the Security Council on Israel’s occupied Golan’s heights and certain rights of the Palestini-
an people, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 66/225 with 167 votes in favor.
55
 More 
recently, a 188-strong majority condemned the protracted U.S. embargo against Cuba.
56
  
It appears, therefore, that the General Assembly is capable of expressing consistent ma-
jorities when the international community finds a situation or conduct obviously incompati-
ble with the Charter principles. It seems thus striking that what is unanimously perceived 
by the North(-West) as a plain illegal annexation by use of force (framed often as ‘aggres-
sion’)
57
 has reached a majority far less significant (52 percent of members in favor) than that 
expressed against Iraq in 1990 (90.5 percent), for a conduct the North(-West) tends to virtu-
ally frame within the same Charter provisions. To account Russia’s diplomatic efforts at the 
U.N. for such a difference would seem a critical overstatement: as shown, in adverse yet cer-
tainly less dramatic votes, the U.S. managed to gather the support of only a handful of (mi-
nor) states.  
Consequently, it is submitted that when the General Assembly expresses itself with such 
a minimal majority in cases where key Charter principles are at stake, their flagrant viola-
tion is, at least, not apparent. Moreover, with regard to Russia’s alleged use of force (which 
the resolution, in fact, does not mention), it seems that U.N. members still hold sense to the 
Nicaragua and Oil Platform ICJ decisions,
58
 as the conduct did not appear to qualify as an 
act of aggression or unlawful use of force by means of an armed attack whose ‘scale and ef-
fect’ constituted an outright violation of Article 2 Charter. Therefore, it is believed that a 
General Assembly non-binding resolution passed with a modest majority may hardly be re-
lied upon per se in determining flagrant violations of core principles of the Charter. 
 
54. G.A. Res. 66/253 B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/253 B (Aug. 7, 2012) (passing with 12 votes against, 31 abstentions, 
and 17 absents). 
55. G.A. Res. 66/225, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/225 (Mar. 29, 2012) (passing with 6 abstentions and 7 against by U.S., 
Israel, Canada, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, and Palau). 
56. G.A. Res. 69/5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/5 (Oct. 29, 2014) (passing of the resolution on the same issue by the General 
Assembly for 23 years in a row; titled ‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo im-
posed by the United States of America against Cuba’; the U.S. and Israel voted against, Marshall Islands, Microne-
sia and Palau abstained.). 
57. See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Ukraine (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141291.pdf. 
58. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 195, 
231(June 27); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 51(Nov. 6, 2003); see also Aurel Sari, 
Ukraine Insta-Symposium: When does the Breach of a Status of Forces Agreement amount to an Act of Aggres-
sion? The Case of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet SOFA, OPINIO JURIS, (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/06/ukraine-insta-symposium-breach-status-forces-agreement-amount-act-
aggression-case-ukraine-black-sea-fleet-sofa/; see also Karl Zemanek, Armed Attack, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. (Oxford University Press 2015), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e241. 
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Two considerations could be briefly added. First, states might have weighed in the fact 
that Ukraine virtually did not engage in any defense of its territory threatened by the al-
leged use of force (cf. subsection V.B.b). Second, this is not the first time that, in a compara-
ble circumstance, the use of force would anyway be ultimately acquiesced with by the inter-
national community: India’s 1961 criticized annexation of Goa, that moved from a self-
evident strong territorial connection, eventually succeeded not by virtue of a pre-colonial ti-
tle against Portugal, but because it furthered a self-determination instance.
59  
V. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF CRIMEA’S SECESSION FROM UKRAINE 
AND ACCESSION TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
A. The tectonic clash between territorial integrity and self-
determination 
Editorial constraints force this part of the analysis to painful brevity. Territorial integrity 
is a cornerstone of contemporary international law, and the prohibition on the threat or use 
of force against territorial integrity is perceived as a jus cogens norm.60 Equally so, however, 
is the current perception of self-determination.61 Yet, the relationship between these two 
principles seems to evolve and be understood unevenly by states. In general, it may be as-
sumed that the principle of territorial integrity constitutes an ontological premise of the 
Charter system. On the other hand, the principle of self-determination, while over the time 
surging to critical importance, is bound to exert a less axiomatic normative value, especially 
outside the colonial context to which it is genetically tied.
62
 Indeed, as then-Professor Craw-
ford noted, the question of the ambit of self-determination, and self-government, and the ter-
 
59. SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST 267 (Clarendon, 1996) (this also explains India’s abstention on Res. 
68/262, and the public statements in support of Russia’s position. Other instances of ‘recovery’ of pre-colonial pos-
sessions – e.g. Indonesia with East Timor, Morocco with Western Sahara, Iraq with Kuwait, Argentina with the 
Falklands Islands – failed; none of these, however, dealt with the self-determination aspect; in this respect). See 
CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 65-66 (Oxford, 3rd ed. 1996). 
60. See Ulf Linderfalk, The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever Think About 
the Consequences?, 18:5 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 853 (2007). 
61. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 661, 29 (June 30); see also G. G. Fitzmaurice, Third Re-
port on the Law of Treaties, 2 Y.B. OF THE INT’L L. COMMISSION 20-46 (1958), available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1958_v2.pdf; see also DAVID RAIC, STATEHOOD AND 
THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 1, 219 (Martinus Nijhoff 2002).   
62. See the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 
14, 1960) (“All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their polit-
ical status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”); see also Chimene Keitner & W. 
Michael Reisman, Free Association: The United States Experience, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 5-6 (2003) (describing 
Clause 2 of the Declaration as “an authentic explanation of how to grant independence”).  
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ritories to which it applies, while occurring jointly with an extension of minority rights (in-
cluding national minorities), has arguably remained as much a matter of politics as law.
63
 
The basic reference for the study of the relationship between territorial integrity and self-
determination is usually Principle 5, paragraph 7, of the 1970 Friendly Relations Declara-
tion.
64
 According to the authoritative interpretation of Crawford, a state whose government 
represents the whole people of its territory, without distinction of any kind, complies with 
the principle of self-determination in respect of all of its people, “and is entitled to the protec-
tion of its territorial integrity.”
65
 This famous statement operates a conceptual reversal, 
where states are ‘entitled’ to territorial integrity when complying with the self-
determination principle. The Supreme Court of Canada adopted this construction in the 
1998 Quebec Secession Case, where it found that, “[a] state whose government represents the 
whole of the people or peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without 
discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its own internal arrange-
ments, is entitled to the protection under international law of its territorial integrity.”
66
 The 
Court also reviewed the possibility of the last resort exercise of self-determination through 
secession, when any meaningful self-determination instance is ‘totally frustrated’ out of a 
‘complete blockage.’
67
  
Thus, the current most advanced—yet grounded on a public international law dis-
course—approaches read sovereignty as an ‘entitlement,’ reversing the relationship between 
territorial integrity and self-determination: defaulting the latter puts the former in question. 
Consequently, external self-determination without the consent of the sovereign is legitimate 
only in the case of carence de souveraineté, i.e., where entities part of a metropolitan state 
“have been governed in such a way as to make them in effect non-self-governing territo-
ries”
68
 (e.g., Bangladesh). In other words, there must be a clear violation of a jus cogens norm 
 
63. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 115 (Oxford 2012); see also JAMES 
CRAWFORD, STATE PRACTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO UNILATERAL SECESSION (1997) (Re-
port to Government of Canada concerning unilateral secession by Quebec).  
64. “Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as de-
scribed above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.” The provision was reaffirmed in the 1993 UN Vienna World Conference on 
Human Rights (with the sole difference that the last words were substituted with the more generic ‘without distinc-
tion of any kind’). 
65. See THE CREATION OF STATES, supra note 63, at 119 (emphasis added).  
66. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2. S.C.R. 217, 284 (Can.).   
67. The Court, however, concluded that “it remains unclear whether this [right of remedial secession] actually reflects 
an established international law standard” and that “the consensus among legal scholars at this time is that interna-
tional law does not recognize a right to secede in other circumstances, but that it does not unequivocally prohibit it 
either.” See also Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 31, 33 (1997).  
68. THE CREATION OF STATES, supra note 63, at 126. Looking at the verbal tense used by Crawford (have been gov-
erned), it appears that misgovernment has to materially happen. Credible threats (or even long inaction or ‘moder-
ate’ obstacles to the proper exercise of self-determination rights) do not per se result into carence de souveraineté.  
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in order to override the consent needed first to ‘interfere,’ and then eventually alter, the ter-
ritorial integrity of a state. In this context, it has been recognized that external self-
determination may result either in the independence of the self-determination unit as a sep-
arate state, or in its incorporation into or association with another state on the basis of polit-
ical equality for the people of the unit.
69
 
Against the background of this brief overview, the proposed alternative assessment of the 
Crimean transfer follows. 
B. Interpretive reassessment of the relationship between territorial 
integrity and self-determination, in certain specific contexts 
The above brief review, coupled with the earlier comments on GA Res. 68/262, and the 
geo-political and economic shifts outlined in the first section, let believe that, at this junc-
ture, the international legal scholarship should not confine its role to simply establish that a 
certain conduct is devoid of legal value,
70
 e.g., that the Crimean transfer amounts to a new 
‘frozen conflict.’ Several non-colonial instances similar to Crimea may arise in the future. 
Especially in the presence of strong self-determination instances and recent (yet undemo-
cratically decided) titles to territorial sovereignty, solutions other than that identified by the 
Badinter Commission in 1991 can be found.
71
 Within the interpretive boundaries discernible 
from the existing body of international law as seemingly understood by the practice of a sig-
nificant portion of the international community, legal scholars may engage in exploring al-
ternative legal rationales to current critical situations, with a view to contribute to “channel-
ing” future states’ conducts into predictable paths (thus reducing the chance or intensity of 
conflict).  
Thus, taking also into account the interpretive broadening attempts of the principle of 
self-determination the General Assembly has engaged in over the past decades,
72
 and the 
general evolution of human rights, the working hypothesis is that established historical, 
 
69. James Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 1, 161 (1977). 
70. E.g., “Since Russia is powerful enough to pursue its interests anyway, it does not need an ultimately convincing 
legal justification. A justification that is at least not totally absurd, but somehow arguable, is already good enough 
for making a case in the international political sphere.”; see Christian Marxsen, Crimea’s Declaration of Independ-
ence, EJIL: TALK! (March 18, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimeas-declaration-of-independence/. 
71. The Commission elevated sic et simpliciter the domestic administrative S.F.R.Y. demarcations to international 
borders, by applying the uti possidetis juris principle outside of the colonial context. In Opinion no. 1, of 29 No-
vember 1991, it affirmed: “The boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, 
and possibly other adjacent independent states may not be altered except by agreement freely arrived at. Except 
where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by international law.” For a critic ap-
proach, compare Peter Hilpold, The Kosovo Case and International Law: Looking for Applicable Theories, 8 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 47 (2009), with Allain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second 
Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 178 (1992). See also Jure Vidmar, Confining New 
International Borders in the Practice of Post-1990 State Creations, 70 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 319 (2010). 
72. E.g., G.A. Res. 545(VI), (Feb. 5, 1952); G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); G.A. 
Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, at 138-140 (Oct. 24, 2005).  
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ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious bonds carry today a greater weight for minorities 
that seek external self-determination, where (a) the legal title that bounds the self-
determination unit to the current sovereign may be called into question, (b) the relationship 
between the two is unsatisfactory, and (c) the people of the unit expresses a clear will to reu-
nite with the former sovereign. In this perspective, for instance, the stance on Kosovo would 
not undermine Russia’s traditional stance on territorial integrity,
73
 but support an articulat-
ed reassessment of the latter (possibly avoiding the hurdles that the doctrine of humanitari-
an intervention poses for its application).  
Such hypothesized reassessment rests on five cumulative conditions:  
1. Strong historical, cultural, and linguistic bonds; 
2. A fragile sovereign, whose inability or unwillingness to properly deal with the matter has 
contributed to exacerbate the situation, and ultimately fails to perform basic state functions; 
3. A title to territorial sovereignty deriving from a specific set of post-Charter political circum-
stances; 
4. An overall context of reunification with the former sovereign; 
5. The unequivocal will of the people of the self-determination unit.  
The concurrent presence of these conditions may result in that the breakaway of the self-determination 
unit, without the consent of the current sovereign, does not constitute a violation of the principle of territo-
rial integrity but, rather, its reassessment. This hypothesis could explain the non-concurrence of 93 mem-
bers of the international community to a resolution adopted, as the title goes, on the “Territorial integrity of 
Ukraine.” 
The analysis that follows attempts to verify the actual fulfillment of the listed conditions in the case of 
Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. 
1. Strong historical, cultural, and linguistic bonds 
It appears undisputed that the historical, cultural, and linguistic links between Crimea 
and Russia are substantial. In 1774, the Crimean Tatar Khans fell under Russian influence 
with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, and in 1783 the peninsula was annexed to the Russian 
Empire, renamed as Taurida oblast.
74
 Crimea has been part of Russia ever since. After the 
fall of the czarist regime and the establishment of the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics 
(U.S.S.R.), Crimea was established as Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and made part 
of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (S.F.S.R.), where it remained when, in 1945, 
it lost its autonomous status and was reduced to oblast.
75
 
 
73. Synthesized, in relation to self-determination, at § 88 of Russia’s written statement filed in the Kosovo Advisory 
Proceedings. As of Russia’s alleged inconsistency with that stance, see Milanovic, supra note 2. 
74. G. A. HOSKING, RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS: A HISTORY 1, 231 (Harvard University Press, 2001). 
75. MARIA DROHOBYCKY, CRIMEA: DYNAMICS, CHALLENGES, AND PROSPECTS (Maria Drohobychy eds., 1995). The 
‘downgrade’ was due “ostensibly because the forced removal of the Crimean Tatars had eliminated the need for 
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This submission does not contend that U.S.S.R. authorities effectively implemented in 
Crimea a policy of repression of the Tatars (which share ethnic, cultural and religious links 
with the Turks). By the late nineteenth century, Crimean Tatars constituted one of the larg-
est ethnic groups of Crimea’s diverse population (about 25 percent of the total), living along-
side large numbers of Russians and Ukrainians, as well as smaller but significant numbers 
of Germans, Jews, Bulgarians, Belarusians, Turks, Armenians, and Greeks.76 In the 1930s 
and, especially, after WWII, Stalin pursued a policy of repression and mass deportation of 
ethnic nationalities, for which the Tatars suffered the most, as about 200.000 of them (along 
tens of thousands from the other communities) were deported to Central Asia or Siberia.77 
Conversely, over about the same time span, the Russian and Ukrainian population in the 
peninsula doubled.78 The latest available census of the Crimean population, of 2001, indi-
cates that, out of the approximately 2.5 million people living in the peninsula, roughly 60 
percent are Russians, 25 percent Ukrainians, and 12 percent Tatars; moreover, 77 percent of 
Crimeans claimed Russian as their native language (see map 1).79 
 
autonomy”; see Mark Kramer, Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?, WISON CENTER (Mar. 19, 
2014), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-
ago#sthash.lymr5keu.dpuf.  
76. See DROHOBYCKY, supra note 75 at 182; see also HOSKING, supra note 74, at 469.  
77. DROHOBYCKY, supra note 75. See also the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Law no. 1107-I (29 April 
1991) on the ‘Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples.’ 
78. HOSKING, supra note 74 at 469. 
79. See infra Section V(B)(4).  
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For the sake of brevity, it is thought that proof of the bond between the Crimean (and, in 
this respect, Easter Ukraine in general) and the Russian People is exemplified in map 2, 
which shows the results of the 2010 presidential elections (largely unvaried in the whole of 
Ukraine, since at least 2002) and depicts the filo-Russian sentiment of the Crimean popula-
tion (by the significant and continued preference for the pro-Russian candidate since the in-
dependence of Ukraine).
80
 
Similar conclusions could be drawn with regard to religious affiliations (Russian or 
Ukrainian Orthodox Patriarchate).  
2.  Failure to redress and failure to perform basic state func-
tions 
As noted already, it cannot be argued that Ukraine is responsible for actions of violent 
and continued repression of the Crimean population. It is equally not arguable that Ukraine, 
 
80. According to the Central Election Commission, Data of the Presidential Election of 2010, 
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010. 
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in its whole self, qualifies as a ‘failed state’81—let alone that the notion and its implications 
are often criticized by public international law scholars.
82
  
Independently from pure legal assessments, it is a fact that over the past years Ukraine 
experienced significantly worsening performances on key ‘fragile state’ indicators (such as 
group grievance, state legitimacy, human rights, and rule of law).83 Ukraine was actually on 
the downslide even before the Crimean crisis occurred,84 as the stand-off between Western 
and Eastern provinces dates back to independence (1992), and gradually worsened, with Ki-
ev unable to address the issue satisfactorily. While this fragility assessment has obviously no 
legal value per se, it nevertheless shows, coupled with the elements outlined previously, the 
existence of a long-standing critical gridlock affecting Ukraine’s politics and economics, 
whose consequences may ultimately surge to having a legal character.  
In fact, the reaction of the Ukrainian authorities highlights the state incapability or un-
willingness to properly address the Crimean crisis. In addition to the facts already outlined 
in subsection IV.A, it appears that, in the aftermath of the ‘Ukrainian revolution’ of Febru-
ary 2014 (led by pro-E.U. ‘Euromaidan’ movement), the central government, rather than en-
gaging in discussions, fueled local feelings of fears and insecurity, antagonizing the popu-
lace.85 This is in stark contrast with the conduct adopted in 1992, where a similar stand-off 
was resolved with an agreement granting Crimea a greater degree of autonomy and special 
economic status, notwithstanding Russian interference (just 10 days earlier the Russian 
Duma had declared the 1954 transfer of the peninsula to Ukraine null and void).86 Moreo-
ver, the significant defections from the local Ukrainian military, before and after the refer-
endum,87 were coupled, on 24 March, by the unilateral withdrawal of all Ukrainian armed 
 
81. See generally NATASHA M. EZROW & ERICA FRANTZ, FAILED STATES AND INSTITUTIONAL DECAY: 
UNDERSTANDING INSTABILITY AND POVERTY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2013). 
82. E.g., H. J. Richardson, Failed States, Self-Determination, and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and 
Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 1, 1-79 (1996). See generally NEYIRE AKPINARLI, THE 
FRAGILITY OF THE ‘FAILED STATE’ PARADIGM (2010). 
83. See generally EZROW & FRANTZ, supra note 81, at 73, 107, 276; see also the 2014 Fragile State Index, FUND FOR 
PEACE, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/; see also Fragile States: Rankings and Map, FOREIGN POLICY, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/#rankings. The data, collected before the Crimean crisis, are based on 
the World Bank index. See Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Index, WORLD BANK, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.PUBS.XQ/countries. 
84. J. J. Messner, Failed States Index 2014: Somalia Displaced as Most-Fragile State, FUND FOR PEACE (June 24, 
2014), http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-overview. 
85. See, e.g., Roland Oliphant, Vigilante Units to Defend Crimea City Against 'Fascist' Threat from Kiev, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10661617/Vigilante-units-to-defend-Crimea-city-
against-fascist-threat-from-Kiev.html; see also Aleksandar Vasovic & Gabriela Baczynska, Kiev Threatens Crimea 
After Russian Forces Take Over Naval HQ, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-sevastopol-idUSBREA2I1SH20140319.  
86. Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Crimean Russians in Ukraine, UNHCR (2004), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38ec2.html. 
87. See generally Ukrainian Forces Withdraw from Crimea, BBC (Mar. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26713727; Katie Stallard, Ukraine Defection Reflects Escalating Rift, 
SKY NEWS (Mar. 2, 2014), available at http://news.sky.com/story/1219877/ukraine-defection-reflects- escalating-
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forces from Crimea.88 The absence of a proper political response or military reaction—even 
of a non-aggressive character (such as passive resistance)—to the alleged use of force being 
perpetrated against Ukraine may, conversely, show the awareness of central authorities of 
their inability to redress the situation in a region where dissent was beyond recovery. 
To uphold the idea that the state political, administrative, and military presence may 
evaporate in a few weeks, as it has been the case of Ukraine with Crimea, seems conceding 
to a worrisome precedent, in post-Charter times at least, as a matter of international rela-
tions even before law. The Charter principle of territorial integrity is inextricably linked to 
the state’s at least symbolic capability of defending its own territory: Article 2(4)’s obligation 
to, “refrain in … international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity,” does not indeed operate in the case of self-defense, expressly codified too (Article 
51) as a plain recognition that a state should at least be symbolically able to defend, through 
effective governmental institutions, its constituent elements of territory and people, were 
force to be actually used against it.
89
 This basic ‘responsibility to protect’ (which, in the con-
text of the most heinous crimes, constitutes the first pillar of the known doctrine)
90
 repre-
sents a core function of the state: to purport that the Charter has superseded this aspect of 
statehood would seem an overstatement. In this context, and a contrario from more common 
perspectives on the point (i.e., with Russia as aggressor), it may be uneasy to consider legit-
imate the lack of any form of resistance (against the alleged invader) and the unilateral -and 
hasty- withdrawal of Ukraine from Crimea. 
Let it be repeated: the facts and considerations outlined above do not, by themselves, con-
stitute sufficient ground to justify either secession from Ukraine or accession to the Russian 
Federation. They represent, however, one of the elements that, combined with the others, 
explain the rationale behind the non-concurrence of about half U.N. members to GA Res. 
68/262, and the resulting perception that a flagrant violation of international law did not oc-
cur.  
 
rift; Oksana Grytsenko, Crimean Vice Premier Says More than 80 Percent will Support Secession in Vote, Admits 
Presence of Russian Troops, KYIV POST (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/crimean-vice- 
premier-says- over-80- percent-willsupport-seceding- on-referendum- admits-troops-are-russias- 339589.html. 
88. Ukraine ‘Preparing Withdrawal of Troops from Crimea’, BBC (Mar. 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26656617. 
89. Even His Holiness Pope Pius IX symbolically countered the annexation of the Papal States to the Kingdom of Ita-
ly, in 1870, by sending about 13.000 troops to defend Rome against the Italian army. See STEFANO TOMASSINI, 
ROMA, IL PAPA, IL RE. L’UNITÀ D’ITALIA E IL CROLLO DELLO STATO PONTIFICIO (2013). 
90. Whose first pillar (of three), as outlined in the UN SG Report on the R2P, consists in the individual responsibility 
of states to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against human-
ity.  U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶13, UN Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).  
On the topic, see ALEX J. BELLAMY, SARA E. DAVIES & LUKE GLANVILLE, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-137 (2011).  
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3. Title to territorial sovereignty from a highly specific context 
The disputed, ‘fragile’ or ‘deficient’ legal entitlement to territorial sovereignty is a key el-
ement of this analysis. As noted, Crimea was part of Russia from 1783 until 1954 (i.e., until 
after the Charter entered in force), in various forms, under both the czarist empire and Sovi-
et Union. On the other hand, a portion of territory approximately corresponding to present-
day Ukraine fell under Russia’s control since the 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav,91 further ce-
mented with the 1686 Eternal Peace Treaty92 and ultimately consolidated with the 1775 
suppression of the Cossack Hetmanate.93 With the dissolution of the czarist empire, Russian 
and Ukrainian revolutionists signed the two Treaties of Brest-Litovsk with the Central 
Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey) by which, inter alia, Ukraine was recog-
nized first sovereignty, then independence. While the Treaty lasted in force for less than 
nine months, it laid the conditions for an independent Ukraine, which on 30 December 1922, 
would become a U.S.S.R. constituent republic (and, in 1945, a U.N. founding member).
94
   
It seems that the fate of Crimea was determined in 1954 by the independent decision of 
Khrushchev—former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (1938-49) become, 
on 14 September 1953, First Secretary of the U.S.S.R. Central Committee. On 25 January 
1954, the U.S.S.R. Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dealt with the question of the ‘adminis-
trative reassignment’ of Crimea.95 The issue, prepared in secrecy, was apparently decided in 
15 minutes.96 On 1 February, a secret note informed that the U.S.S.R. Presidium was re-
viewing the ‘joint presentation’ (never to be published) of the Praesidi of Russia and 
Ukraine, with regard to the handing over of the Crimean oblast. The transfer decree was 
then issued on 19 February.97 As such, the act plainly qualifies as administrative in nature.  
Regarding the legitimacy of this disposition, two procedural concerns have been raised 
(with, however, undue delay)
98
 which, for the sake of brevity, are not analyzed here. These 
 
91. See HOSKING, supra note 74, at 164.  
92. Eternal Peace Treaty, May 6, 1686, ZENON E. KOHUT, BOHDAN Y. NEBESIO & MYROSLAV YURKEVICH, 
HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF UKRAINE xxxix (2005) (noting the Eternal Peace Treaty which was celebrated be-
tween the Tsardom of Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, partitioning the historical Ukrainian terri-
tory between the two entities.) 
93. During the reign of Peter III and Catherine the Great, Ukraine was divided into various administrative units (New 
or South Russia, Little Russia, and Western Russia). 
94. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1944) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION].  The 1944 amendment to the 1936 U.S.S.R. 
Constitution resulted in Ukraine and Belarus to assume international legal personality. 
95. NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV, MEMOIRS OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, VOLUME 2: REFORMER, 1945–1964 (Sergei 
Krushchev eds., Penn State University Press, 2006); see generally Sergei Khrushchev, Sergey Khrushchev On 
Crimea, WILSON RESEARCH CENTER: DIGITAL ARCHIVE (2010), 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119639 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).  
96. Id.  
97. Mark Kramer, Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?, WILSON CENTER (Mar 19, 2014), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago#docs. 
98. Relating to several procedural anomalies in the adoption of the transfer decree.  
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notwithstanding, another ground potentially renders Ukraine’s title to Crimea deficient: i.e., 
the highly specific context in which the transfer was performed.  
The official Party line explained the transfer as a way to celebrate the 300th anniversary 
of the ‘indissoluble union’ between the Ukrainian and Russian (and Belarusian) peoples, 
sealed with the 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav.99 It therefore seems that the transfer was decided 
on a background of unity between the two states (and Belarus), begun with the czarist em-
pire and continued under the U.S.S.R. Two clues corroborate this approach: first, there is no 
evidence that, within the overall Soviet Union context, the transfer materially affected the 
everyday life of Crimeans; second, and similarly to Croatian Tito
100
 and Georgian Stalin, it 
looks unfeasible that Russian-born yet Ukrainian-raised101 Khrushchev would understand 
the transfer as anything more than an administrative redistribution of what, in the context 
of the U.S.S.R. territorial extension, represented a parcel of territory. The swiftness with 
which the whole process was handled (three months), and the absence of any political or lo-
cal participation, is believed to highlight the contextual elements, here surging to critical 
value. The relevance, in international law, of a transfer made within the U.S.S.R. geograph-
ic, political, and legal domain, seems questionable. As Unions’ acts may not be ipso facto as-
sumed to dispose for the time they cease to exist, consent to dispositions of territory within 
such specific political context should not be ipso jure presumed, once dissolution happens.102 
The same may be said with regard to Serbia’s position on the domestic division of the SFRY 
territory: to its detriment, but accepted as long as within a unitary context.
103
 Nor does the 
point becomes immaterial with the subsequent international engagements Russia undertook 
to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity:
104
 those represented ‘patches’ to the status quo that 
could not cure a title ab origine deficient because affecting the normatively superior and in-
ternational right to proper self-determination of Crimea (assuming Russia not to have used 
force against Ukraine, as per the terms referred to earlier). 
 
99. Some pointed out that the Ukrainian Communist Party proved essential to Khrushchev’s election as First Secretary 
of the U.S.S.R. Central Committee, following Stalin’s death. Others, to a symbolic reparation gesture for the 
Ukrainian ‘Holodomor’ (the catastrophic Soviet famine of 1932-33 caused by Stalin’s economic policies). See 
DROHOBYCKY, supra note 75, at 4; see also BOHDAN NAHAYLO & VICTOR SWOBODA, SOVIET DISUNION: A 
HISTORY OF THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM IN THE USSR 207 (Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1990). 
100. In the context of S.F.R.Y.; see ANA S. TRBOVICH, A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF YUGOSLAVIA’S DISINTEGRATION 1, 
433 (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
101. From his adolescence, Khrushchev lived mostly in Ukraine (in the Donbas province), where he started his political 
career. 
102. Cf. Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 95, 
104 (Sept. 25), where the Court discards the U.S.S.R. political context as an element for the evaluation of Slo-
vakia’s claimed fundamental change of circumstances. In this case, however, the issue is a territorial transfer and 
not an infrastructure. 
103. TRBOVICH, supra note 100. 
104. E.g., Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 5, 1994), 
http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security- assurances-
1994/p32484. 
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Indeed, with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., in December 1991,105 Russia made its stance 
on Crimea clear: in January 1992, in parallel to local Crimean turmoil generated by the fu-
ture status of the province, the Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the 1954 transfer of 
Crimea to Ukraine as invalid.106 On 21 May, the Duma, with a decree ‘On a legal assess-
ment of the decisions of Supreme Organs of the R.S.FSR state power on change in the status 
of Crimea,’ declared the 1954 transfer illegal
107
 and called for negotiations on the future of 
Crimea.108 Until the signature of the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership’ 
with Ukraine, on 31 May 1997,109 Russia continued to persistently object the international 
legal relevance of the 1954 transfer.110 
To conclude, with regard to the legal entitlement to Crimea, the Ukrainian title is found 
per se valid, even though deficient. The weakness of the title rests on i) the highly specific 
context (U.S.S.R.), ii) circumstances (lack of self-determination inquiry), and iii) the interna-
tional law regime (as the Charter had already entered into force) that characterize the 1954 
transfer. All these elements are at the basis of the interpretive reassessment of territorial 
integrity here reviewed. 
4. The reunification context 
The last condition—which, however, triggers the investigation on all others—rests on 
the evident display of the will of the people of a self-determination unit to reunite with the 
former sovereign (it is not possible to properly investigate here whether Crimea qualifies as 
a self-determination unit—the author provisionally assumes that it does). In the case of 
Crimea, this aspect is of particular significance. In the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 
the ICJ confirmed that, save for exceptional circumstances, any territorial change of legal 
status requires a free expression of the will of the people.
111
 In this respect, this author 
shares the opinion that, outside of the colonial context—and, more importantly, with regard 
 
105. Declaration no. 142-Н of the Supreme Soviet, of 26 Dec. 1991, formally establishing the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union as a state and subject of international law.  
106. See Minorities at Risk Project, supra note 86. 
107. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI & PAIGE SULLIVAN, RUSSIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES: 
DOCUMENTS, DATA, AND ANALYSIS 284 (1997) (“By reason of violation of the R.S.FSR Constitution and legisla-
tive procedure.”). 
108. Calling for the resolution of the Crimean issue by means of interstate negotiations, with the participation of Crimea 
and on the basis of a popular referendum. 
109. The Treaty, which marked Russia formal recognition of Ukraine’s independence, contains guarantees as of sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, borders, non-interference, and protection of minorities (Arts. 11 and 12). 
110. The Treaty was ultimately ratified by the Ukraine only on 14 January 1998, and delayed the ratification of the 
Black Sea Agreement, signed on 28 May and by which Russia kept its naval base in Sevastopol. Russia did not rat-
ify the Treaty of Friendship until Ukraine ratified the Black Sea Agreement. 
111. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12 (Oct. 1975). 
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to facts that have taken place after the Charter entered in force—a referendum is a neces-
sary yet not sufficient requirement when such a change is sought.
112
 
That Crimea never properly integrated into Ukraine, or that Crimeans are showing no 
intention to return to Ukraine now (as opposed to the constant tension for independence of 
the Baltic states during Soviet times), seems to be established (see the previous sections).  
With the dusk of the Soviet Union, Crimean nationalism arose, repeatedly manifesting 
the will of the majority of its population for autonomy, and to maintain close links with Rus-
sia. On 20 January 1991, a first referendum was held, seeking for the “restoration of the 
Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a subject of the U.S.S.R. and as a party to 
the Union Treaty” (as it had been the case from 1922 until 1945).
113
 Over 80 percent of the 
electorate participated, 94 percent answered in the positive.114 In light of the result, on 12 
February 1991, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet passed the law ‘On the restoration of the Cri-
mean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.’ These acts did not change the fact that Crimea 
still belonged to the Ukrainian SSR,
115
 and the fast pace of U.S.S.R. dissolution (formally 
declared by the Supreme Soviet on 26 December 1991), prevented the newly reconstituted 
Autonomous Republic within Ukraine to take further steps to reassess its status within the 
U.S.S.R. Soon afterwards, with the referendum for the independence of Ukraine (1 Decem-
ber 1991), Crimean support was the lowest of all the country (54 percent)
116
 with a signifi-
cantly lower turnout (65 percent) than the referendum held just 10 months earlier.117 Five 
months later (on 5 May 1992), the Crimean parliament declared independence, subject to a 
referendum to be held in August. The referendum was ultimately withheld, as Ukraine con-
ceded in the meantime a greater degree of autonomy to the region, within the newly consti-
tuted Unitary Republic. However, less than two years after (on 27 March 1994), concurrent-
ly with the first round of both Crimean and Ukrainian elections, the Crimean Republican 
Party held a non-binding second referendum on the status of Crimea. Reportedly, out of a 
1.3 million-voter turnout, 78.4 percent supported greater autonomy from Ukraine.118 In the 
 
112. Jure Vidmar, Crimea’s Referendum and Secession: Why it Resembles Northern Cyprus More than Kosovo, EJIL: 
TALK! (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimeas-referendum-and- secession-why- it-resembles-northern- 
cyprus-more- than-kosovo/; see also Jure Vidmar, The Annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will of the 
People, 152 GER. L. J., 365 –383 (2015). 
113. DROHOBYCKY, supra note 75.  
114. Id.; see also Minorities at Risk Project, supra note 86. 
115. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1924) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] (According to the U.S.S.R. Constitution, 
only Republics parties of the original U.S.S.R. Union Treaty had the power to decide on their own whether to re-
main in the Union.). 
116. Which, for instance, would have not been sufficient for Montenegro to declare itself independent, in light of the 55 
percent supermajority established (as suggested by the Council of Europe) in Article 60 of the Constitution of Ser-
bia and Montenegro. 
117. See Minorities at Risk Project, supra note 86.  
118. MARK C. WALKER, THE STRATEGIC USE OF REFERENDUMS: POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND DEMOCRACY108-109 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 1st ed. 2003).  In addition, 82.8 percent approved dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship, and 
77.9 percent favored giving Crimean presidential decrees the force of law. Id. 
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concurrent elections, the pro-Russian party block received 67 percent of votes. The following 
month (on 23 August 1994), the city council of Sevastopol, backed by 36 of its 42 members, 
declared the city to be part of Russia and subject to Russian legislation only.119 Four years 
later, prompted by the ratification process of the Treaty of Friendship and the Black Sea 
Agreement between Russia and Ukraine (on 4 February 1998), the Crimean parliament 
again voted in favor to hold a third referendum on the question whether Crimeans wished to 
return under Russian jurisdiction, or to restore the provisions of the less restrictive 1992 
Crimean constitution, and to adopt Russian as the region’s official language. Eventually, on 
21 October 1998, the Crimean parliament approved a new Constitution (the fifth since 
1992), which discarded the earlier drafts’ call for attributes of statehood (such as separate 
citizenship, or legal system) and accepted Ukrainian as the sole official language of Cri-
mea.120 In the course of the years that followed, tensions thus shifted from independence 
claims to linguistic and minority protection, which Kiev nevertheless never managed to 
soothe. Lastly, the turmoil taking place in Ukraine since 2013 reheated the Crimean claims.  
The 2014 referendum has been criticized for the hasty pace with which it was organized, 
its procedural inconsistencies, alleged pressure on the Crimeans to vote (and to do so in a 
certain way), and presence of the Russian military to that effect. Far from disqualifying such 
critics, it nevertheless appears that nationalist support in Crimea for greater autonomy, pro-
tection of Russian language and culture, and possibly reunification with Russia has been 
constant, even before Ukraine’s independence.121 This holds true also with regard to the re-
current tensions sparked between Kiev and Simferopol (along more or less pronounced back-
ings of Moscow).  
It thus seems that long-standing self-determination instances in Crimea have lasted for 
22 years before dramatically stepping up to an external self-determination outcome, against 
Ukraine’s failure to properly address them. It is nevertheless clear that such failure, absent 
those grave events possibly justifying ‘remedial secession,’ does not per se qualify as suffi-
cient ground for external self-determination. It may, nonetheless, concur, jointly with the 
other conditions considered in this submission, to provide for a sufficient justification to the 
interpretive reassessment of the principle of territorial integrity here investigated.  
C. Preliminary finding 
In light of the above, it is found that the legitimacy of Crimea’s secession from Ukraine 
and accession to the Russian Federation (without regard, on the one hand, to the issue of 
Russia’s alleged use of force, aggression and illegal annexation, and, on the other, Ukraine’s 
failure to exercise any action aimed at defending its territory and protect its population un-
 
119. The declaration, which had no concrete legal effect, was immediately denounced as illegal by Ukraine. 
120. Crimean separatism had lost momentum after the division of the Black Sea Fleet. 
121. For an account of related events, see Minorities at Risk Project, supra note 86. Also, the two choices given in the 
2014 referendum are the same that were proposed for the planned referendum of 1998. 
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der the alleged attack) may be justified only if one assumes that there has been sufficient 
and legitimate expression of the will of Crimeans to this end.  
In this respect, if one factors in the instances of Crimeans’ expression of will as consist-
ently presented since before Ukraine’s independence, then the requirement could be consid-
ered met; however, if one focuses on the three-week window within which referendum, se-
cession, and accession took place (February-March 2014), the condition may not be met, as 
the central government may not have had a sufficient opportunity to address the Crimean 
demands and solve the issue internally—which remains the main ambit of application of 
the principle of self-determination. Indeed, GA Res. 68/262 deals with Crimean referendum, 
but because of it voting record, it does not offer a clear view of the position of the interna-
tional community on the point.  
VI. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED INTERPRETIVE REASSESSMENT AT LARGE 
As illustrated, this submission aims, in specific contexts arisen after the entry into force 
of the Charter, at analyzing whether a claim of external self-determination, in the absence of 
consent of the parent state, may be legitimately based on a ground alternative to that oth-
erwise scholarly accepted of carence de souveraineté. To do so, the analysis scrutinizes a ‘con-
trolled expansion’ of the principle of self-determination which would ultimately result not in 
the breach of territorial integrity, but in its interpretive reassessment. This in order to con-
tain inconsistent or ‘uncontrolled expansions’ of the rule, deriving from political (or legal) 
convenience or expediency, which ultimately undermine international law as a system—for 
which the North(-West) bears primary responsibility.
122
  
From the analysis carried out thus far, it appears that a highly specific context, both in 
terms of fact and law, characterizes the Crimean dispute between Russia and Ukraine. The 
appraisal of such specific context is believed to have resulted in large parts of the interna-
tional community not condemning Crimea’s secession or Russia’s conduct.  
In light of all the above, the presence of the five cumulative conditions of (a) strong histor-
ical, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic bonds, (b) an incapable or unwilling sovereign, ultimately 
failing to exercise basic state functions, (c) a territorial legal entitlement tied to a highly spe-
cific context (between two members of a political union, carried out through such Union’s le-
gal machinery, at a time when the Charter was already in force), (d) an overall context of 
reunification with the former sovereign, and (e) the unequivocal expression of will of the 
people, could make up for the lack of consent of the current sovereign to the transfer of the 
self-determination unit, and may not be perceived as a violation of its territorial integrity 
but, rather, its reassessment. 
 
122. Cf. Marxsen, supra note 70. 
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Being sufficiently specific, the implications at large of the proposed interpretive reas-
sessment are relatively limited. Indeed, the raw theoretical seeds outlined in this article 
would operate only where long-presented internal self-determination instances are improp-
erly dealt with by the current sovereign, of which the self-determination unit is part due to a 
highly specific post-Charter transfer title made deficient by its non-conformity with the 
Charter regime of self-determination as interpreted by the ICJ.  
For instance, this approach may lend support to some of the border adjustment instances 
in the former-U.S.S.R.. However, only some of these qualify under all five outlined criteria. 
For instance, Abkhazia comes close to meeting all conditions: unilaterally handed by Stalin 
to Soviet Georgia, yet ethnically and historically linked to Russia, since before the end of the 
U.S.S.R. its people have manifested the will not to sever ties with the Federation; however, 
the transfer dates from 1931, thus predating the Charter. South Ossetia is a more complex 
case, since Russian is not its principal ethnic group, and the region has been part of Georgia 
since the czars. Ethnically Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh also presents difficulties: while the 
Armenian presence is historically undisputed, there was never an Armenian state including 
the Nagorno-Karabakh area within its borders; moreover, it seems that the area, landlocked 
within Azerbaijan until 1994, has been attributed to this latter by Stalin in 1921, right after 
the definition of all territorial questions with Turkey;
123
 even if after 1994 the area has been 
expanded up to the Armenian border,
124
 the requisite of ‘reunion’ with the former sovereign 
(due to an arbitrary intra-U.S.S.R. act of separation) seems missing. Also in the case of 
Transnistria the proposed interpretive reassessment would not operate, as here most condi-
tions are not met (and quasi-meeting clearly does not mend the deficiency).
125
  
With regard to former Yugoslavia (S.F.R.Y.), Republika Srpska (R.S.), one of the constitu-
ent ‘Entities’126 of Bosnia and Hercegovina (B.H.), represents an articulated case. On the one 
side, the former domestic divisions of S.F.R.Y. (elevated in 1991 as international borders ipso 
facto by the Badinter Commission)
127
 had all been established within the context of Tito’s 
S.F.R.Y., after WWII: as such, whilst valid, they are affected by a deficiency similar to that 
found earlier for Crimea. Unequivocal then are the cultural, linguistic, and religious bond 
shared by the peoples of R.S. and Serbia, and the will of the former to join the latter.128 Such 
desire seems fuelled also by the general B.H. context, often perceived as an artificial or dys-
 
123. Treaty of Kars, Oct. 23, 1921, 120 B.F.S.P. 906.  
124. Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement, May 11, 1994. 
125. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, [2012] ICJ Reports 99, at 
105-106. 
126. THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA-HERTZEGOVINA [BOSN. & HERZ.] [CONSTITUTION] 1995, art. 3 (rev. 2009).  
127. See supra note 72.  
128. E.g., the referendum in Republika Srprska of 1991 (to remain within Yugoslavia/Serbia); the boycott of the Bosni-
an-wide referendum in 1992 for independence; the referendum held in Serbia in 1993 on the unification with 
Republika Srpska. 
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functional state,
129
 where frequent impasses between its constitutive ethnic-based ‘Entities’ 
frustrate their fruitful coexistence. On the other side, it appears not immediate that Serbia 
qualifies as the ‘former sovereign’ of either R.S. or B.H.. Further, the current boundaries of 
R.S. within B.H. are neither historic nor undemocratically altered during the past Socialist 
regime (i.e., by Tito).
130
 
Lastly, lacking the ‘fragility’ requirement of either or both the state and the legal entitle-
ment to territorial sovereignty, the theory does not operate in those North(-West) states fac-
ing forms of independentism within their own territory (e.g., Spain, Belgium, U.K.). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The recent events in Crimea sparked unanimous protests in the North(-West). A signifi-
cant part of the international community, however, has not been equally vocal, while some 
states, even among those who ultimately abstained from the adoption of GA Res. 68/262, 
have explicitly recognized Russia’s interest, and the will of Crimeans. This holds true with 
specific regard to the world’s South(-East).  
In light of the current shift of the world’s power balance between North(-West) and 
South(-East), this article explored whether a political stance could be discernible out of the 
non-concurrence of about the entire South(-East) to the adoption of GA Res. 68/262, and 
which alternative legal assessment of the 2014 Crimean crisis such stance could rely upon. 
More specifically, the analysis aimed at verifying whether a fresh interpretive assessment 
could be extrapolated out of the relevant facts and practice.  
The focus of this analysis has been the specific title to territorial sovereignty, in connec-
tion with the clear will of the people to reunite with the former sovereign, by virtue of strong 
historical, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural links, and in light of the protracted failure of the 
current sovereign to properly address internal self-determination instances. The working 
hypothesis has been that the concurrent presence of these conditions may override the oth-
erwise necessary consent of the current sovereign to the reassessment of its territory.  
It is also argued that, in the framework of modern and highly structured multi-ethnic po-
litical Unions (i.e., S.F.R.Y., U.S.S.R.), intra-Union apportionments of territory may only 
have domestic and administrative character, thus could not surge to international bounda-
ries ipso facto (not anyway through the uti possidetis juris principle), especially when deter-
mined after the entry into force of the Charter and in a manner inconsistent with the princi-
ple of self-determination. The rationale behind such apportionments was never to create 
 
129. Cf. J. Borger, Bosnia’s Bitter, Flawed Peace Deal, 20 Years On, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/nov/10/bosnia-bitter-flawed-peace-deal-dayton-agreement-20-years-on.  
130. The current boundaries appear to have been established subsequently to the 1995 Dayton Agreement, in relation to 
the territory then occupied by the Bosnian Serbs during the conflict that plagued the country between 1992-1995; 
see EGBERT JAHN, 1 INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: POLITICAL ISSUES UNDER DEBATE  65-70 (2015). 
15 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (2017) 
156 
boundaries, nor were the relevant peoples involved in their determination (e.g., in historical-
ly traditional forms such as wars, or in more modern forms such as public or political debate, 
or referendum). The granting of ipso facto international relevance to post-Charter intra-
Union territorial dispositions (as opposed to the promotion of negotiations among the con-
tenders) ultimately results into igniting more conflict, rather that settling it (Yugoslavia be-
ing the antonymous of this). 
The deficient legal entitlement to territorial sovereignty, nevertheless, does not become a 
pathology until all other conditions of the investigated interpretive reassessment of the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity are concurrently met. Cumulative application would thus result 
in limited material impact on the numerous ongoing self-determination disputes worldwide. 
Claims affected would mostly be those where authoritarian regimes have imposed transfers 
of self-determination units (or parcels of territory that under the new sovereign qualify as 
such) after 1945, and only when such units wish to reunite with the former sovereign. 
Hence, the proposed approach concerns only specific transfers, that have taken place after 
the Charter entered in force (with the ensuing progressive tension between the understand-
ing of its central tenets, territorial integrity of states, and self-determination of peoples). Far 
from advocating for the independence of parcel of territories, the article focused on the spe-
cific instance of the right of external self-determination within the perimeter of reunion with 
the former sovereign. This proposed interpretation, in light of the specific context on which it 
is grounded, is believed to reflect the lowest common denominator that may be inferred from 
the non-concurrence to GA Res. 68/262 of 93 U.N. members to characterize the issue at stake 
as a flagrant violation of the fundamental tenets of the Charter. Independently from the di-
verging views on the topic, this author is of the opinion that the opposition, silence, or ab-
sence expressed by almost half of the international community on such a delicate topic is 
worth more than its simple disqualification, or discard. 
 
